SUPERVISORY LIABILITY IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS AFTER IQBAL
Patrick Boynton*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court effected two earthquakes in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.1 Often
lost in the tremors of the Court’s holding on pleading standards2 were the
tremors from the Court’s holding on supervisory liability. At the time,
commentators thought this second holding shook loose the doctrinal
foundations of supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.3 Standing eight years
removed, now is the time to assess how Iqbal has, in fact, changed supervisory
liability doctrine—and how it has not. For these purposes, we will focus on
exemplary decisions made by the Third Circuit on culpability, the Ninth
Circuit on the municipal liability parallel, the First and Sixth Circuits on
causation, and the Second Circuit on personal involvement.
It is important that we first establish the contours of supervisory liability
under § 1983 and Bivens. As the Court emphasized in Iqbal, supervisory
liability is a misnomer.4 It does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor
for her subordinate’s actions.5 Nor does it impose respondeat superior liability
*
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Senior Editor, Volume 21, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law; J.D. Candidate, 2019,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2014, The Pennsylvania State University. I am
grateful to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Professor Catherine T. Struve, Articles Editor Gabrielle Piper,
Executive Editor Steven Mills, and the rest of the Journal of Constitutional Law team for the many hours
of hard work they generously dedicated to this Comment. It could not have happened without them.
Most of all, thank you to my parents for inspiring and supporting my career in the law.
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
See Adam Steinman, Ever Wonder Which SCOTUS Cases Have Been Cited the Most?, LAW PROFESSORS
BLOGS NETWORK: CIV. PROC. & FED. CTS. BLOG (Sept. 21, 2016),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2016/09/ever-wonder-which-scotus-cases-have-beencited-the-most.html (noting that Iqbal and its sister case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), are the third and fourth most cited Supreme Court decisions).
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that a plaintiff can seek redress for an injury caused by federal
official’s deprivation of a constitutional right).
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (recogizing that government officials cannot be held liable in a Bivens
action for the conduct of subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior).
See Vicarious Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The vicarious liability of an
employer for torts committed by employees should not be confused with the liability an employer
has for his own torts.” (quoting KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT
LAW 181 (2d ed. 2002))).
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on the theory that an employer is liable for her employee’s wrongful acts
within the scope of her employment.6 Rather, supervisory liability imposes
liability on a supervisor for her actions, or her failures to act, which were the
proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury.7 In other words, supervisory liability
is imposed on a supervisor for her own role in causing her subordinate to
commit a tort. Recurring theories of supervisory liability, addressed in
different ways from circuit to circuit, include: (1) presence at the scene or
direction to take a challenged action, (2) failure to train subordinates, (3)
violation of statutory duty, (4) failure to discipline or control subordinates
with a history of misbehavior, and (5) the creation of, or the failure to correct,
unconstitutional policies, practices, or conditions.8
Two procedural vehicles are available for plaintiffs seeking to impose
supervisory liability for constitutional violations. For actions against state
officials, plaintiffs may bring their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For
actions against federal officials, plaintiffs may bring their claims as Bivens
actions.9 Neither vehicle is “a source of substantive rights” but rather a
“method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of
the United States Constitution.”10 While the Supreme Court has “never
expressly held that the contours of Bivens and § 1983 are identical,”11 it has
repeatedly applied particular doctrinal features identically to both Bivens and
§ 1983 actions.12
Section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person” acting under color of
state law who either “subjects, or cause to be subjected” another person to a
deprivation of her constitutional rights.13 The “causes . . . to be subjected”
language of the text explicitly envisions liability for supervisors who cause
constitutional deprivations.14 Indeed, § 1983 was passed as section one of the
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See Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2007) (reiterating that a prison official may not be
held liable under § 1983 for the alleged Eighth Amendment violations of a subordinate based on
respondeat superior); see also Santiago v. City of Phila., 435 F. Supp. 136, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (noting
that, unlike the master-servant relationship envisioned by respondeat superior, a supervisor and
subordinate are coworkers).
MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 4:3 (3d ed. 2018).
Id. § 4:6.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)
(holding that a plaintiff can seek redress for injuries caused by a federal official’s deprivation of a
constitutional right).
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 82 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See William N. Evans, Comment, Supervisory Liability After Iqbal: Decoupling Bivens from Section 1983,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1401, 1404–05 (2010) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly
reinforced the idea that Bivens and § 1983 are coextensive.”)
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
But see Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 299 n.104 (2010) (arguing that the “causes . . . to be subjected”
language is mere surplusage and does not give rise to supervisory liability).
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Ku Klux Klan Act of 187115 and it “was not directed at the perpetrators of
these deeds as much as at the state officials who tolerated and condoned
them.”16 By contrast, Bivens is based in federal decisional law and claims
under it were only recognized a hundred years after § 1983. Indeed, since
1983, the Court has repeatedly disfavored Bivens actions.17 Because of the
additional levels of “strenuousness” analysis that they require a plaintiff to
prove, moreover, Bivens remedies tend to be awarded less frequently than
remedies under § 1983.18
As a policy matter, supervisory liability serves several functions. It better
provides for victim compensation by imposing liability on supervisory
officers, who are more likely to be able to satisfy judgments against them than
line officers are.19 It deters future violations by imposing liability on
supervisors, who have the power and resources to implement reforms.20 It
provides for punitive damages.21 On a rhetorical level, supervisory liability
demonstrates the systemic nature of constitutional violations, whereas claims
against individual officers can be more easily dismissed as aberrations.22 On
a procedural level, a clearly-delineated supervisory liability doctrine helps to
prevent officials from becoming overly cautious and helps to provide clear
boundaries for potential plaintiffs.23 Finally, on an individual level,
supervisory liability can carry tremendous personal vindication, as
exemplified by Javaid Iqbal himself.24
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ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1996)).
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 n.11 (1989) (discussing the origins of the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871).
See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012) (holding that Bivens liability does not extend
to employees of private prisons); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 541 (2007) (holding that Bivens
liability does not extend to takings executed by the Bureau of Land Management); Corr. Servs.
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (holding that Bivens liability does not extend to contractors
with a federal agency); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994) (holding that
Bivens liability does not extend to actions against federal agencies); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S.
412, 414 (1988) (holding that there is no Bivens remedy available to an erroneous denial of Social
Security disability benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987) (holding that
there is no Bivens remedy available for injuries incidental to military service); Bush v. Lucas, 462
U.S. 367, 368 (1983) (holding that a Bivens action would be inappropriate where regulatory
remedies already exist); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (holding that a Bivens action
is not available for members of the military against their officers).
Evans, supra note 12, at 1405.
AVERY ET AL., supra note 7, § 4:3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379, 408 (2017) (discussing positive impacts
the case had on Javaid Iqbal’s personal life).
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I. PRE-IQBAL JURISPRUDENCE
Before Iqbal, to successfully make out a claim for supervisory liability
under either § 1983 or Bivens, a plaintiff had to show: (1) there was a failure
to supervise or train,25 (2) that failure to supervise or train was the proximate
cause of a plaintiff’s constitutional injury, and (3) that failure was committed
with the necessary culpability.26 In addition, most courts applied a sum-ofthe-parts “personal involvement” consideration.27
The first element, the act itself, required that the plaintiff establish each
defendant’s failure to supervise or train a subordinate.28 This analysis was
conducted on an individual basis, requiring each defendant to have
“participated, encouraged, authorized or acquiesced in” active
unconstitutional behavior.29 A supervisory role was not established by a
formalistic organization title indicating a supervisor-subordinate
relationship, but rather by the defendant’s contextual, supervisory role.30
The second element required that a plaintiff establish that the
supervisor’s failure of supervision or of training was the proximate cause of
her constitutional injury.31 A plaintiff had to satisfy the standard tort law
questions of foreseeability and remoteness, as well as the supervisory liabilityspecific question of an “affirmative causal link.”32 The foreseeability prong
was satisfied if the plaintiff could show that the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that her actions would cause her subordinate to deprive
the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.33 While imprecise, remoteness in
part referred to the significance of a lapse in time.34 The final requirement
of an affirmative link “contemplate[d] proof that the supervisor’s conduct led
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Failures to supervise or train included specific theories, such as a supervisor directing a subordinate
to take an act that violated a plaintiff’s rights, or such as a supervisor knowing of a subordinate’s act
and acquiescing in it. See, e.g., MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF
THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 4.6.1 (COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT 2007).
Estate of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005).
See Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2008).
See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2006) (denying a § 1983 claim against
certain defendants because their direct personal liability was not established).
Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
See Evans, supra note 12, at 1411 (“‘Supervisory liability’ is contextual, not formalistic; the title of
‘supervisor’ does not create supervisory liability.”).
Cox v. Sugg, 484 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2007).
See Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 53 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1st Cir. 1995); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 807
(4th Cir. 1994) (Hall, J., dissenting).
See Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see, e.g., Doe v. Wright,
82 F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1996) (declining to hold a supervisor liable for the primary defendant’s
offenses at his subsequent workplace).
Shaw, 13 F.3d at 807 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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inexorably to the constitutional violation.”35 A plaintiff had to “show that
‘an affirmative link exists between the [constitutional] deprivation and either
the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or
his failure to supervise.’”36 The validity of an affirmative link “rapidly
deteriorates with passage of time.”37
The third element, culpability, required that a plaintiff establish the
defendant’s requisite culpability. Some of the most common culpability
requirements for supervisory liability included: (1) reckless disregard,38
(2) subjective deliberate indifference,39 (3) knowing, willful, or reckless
action,40 and (4) gross negligence.41 In the context of a § 1983 claim,
deliberate indifference, “generally requires a showing ‘of more than a single
instance of the lack of training or supervision causing a violation of
constitutional rights.’”42 Simple negligence is not enough to impose § 1983
or Bivens liability on a supervisor.43 Before Iqbal, the circuit courts
approached the level of scienter required to establish supervisory liability in
two main ways. Several circuits varied the scienter required for supervisory
liability depending on the constitutional right at issue.44 Other courts
required a single scienter for supervisory liability, regardless of the
constitutional right at issue.45 Claims based on a failure to train theory
required a showing of deliberate indifference, regardless of the underlying
constitutional right.46
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Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 53 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1st Cir. 1995).
Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512,
1527 (10th Cir. 1988)). In this paragraph, failure to train and failure to supervise refer to the act
element of general § 1983/Bivens causes of action. They do not refer to theories with their own
elements.
Shaw, 13 F.3d at 807.
See, e.g., Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 1993).
See, e.g., Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 254, 256 (5th Cir. 2005).
See, e.g., Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1986).
See, e.g., Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1048 (2d Cir. 1989).
Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Thompson v. Upshur
Cty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)).
See Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 2002) (declining to impose section 1983
liability for mere negligence in supervision); Abate v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. 993 F.2d 107, 110 (5th
Cir. 1993) (holding that mere negligence is not enough to give rise to a Bivens claim). But see
Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that “gross
negligence” can “signify” deliberate indifference).
See, e.g., Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (requiring proof that the supervisor
also acted with the subjective deliberate indifference required to state an Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment claim against his subordinate).
See Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Before Iqbal, most circuits required that a
supervisor act (or fail to act) with the state of mind of deliberate indifference to be liable, no matter
the underlying constitutional violation.”).
Estate of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005).
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Finally, most circuits applied a “personal involvement” requirement.
While no court explicitly outlined how this consideration interacts with the
three canon factors, it seemed to act as a sum-of-the-parts analysis. Courts
alternately cited the act itself,47 the causation factor,48 and the culpability
factor49 as governing the personal involvement analysis. At the end of the
day, “the thrust of courts’ concern is that the defendant’s own actions be
sufficiently connected to the violation of plaintiff’s rights that personal
liability is shown.”50 Personal involvement was by no means a hard-and-fast
rule. While it certainly required more than a supervisor’s mere presence at
the scene where a subordinate allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional
right,51 courts found sufficient personal involvement even in “failure to
intervene” causes of action.52
II. THE ASHCROFT V. IQBAL DECISION
Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani citizen and Muslim, was arrested following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.53 Iqbal alleged that, in the course of
his detention, he was deprived of various constitutional protections.54
Among other officials, Iqbal brought Bivens claims against John Ashcroft,
then the U.S. Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, then the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, alleging that they adopted a policy that
violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights, subjecting him to
unconstitutional, invidious discrimination on account of his race, religion, or
national origin.55
Most discussion of Iqbal analyzes the Court’s landmark holding on
pleading standards, not supervisory liability. Indeed, neither side actually
47
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See Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1183–84 (5th Cir. 1989) (summarizing the court’s ability to
consider all the circumstances of an event to determine whether an individual was a bystander or a
participant in the action); see also Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir.
2007) (“An officer’s liability under section 1983 is predicated on his ‘integral participation’ in the
alleged violation.” (quoting Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294–95 (9th Cir. 1995))).
See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 29–30 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting that each officer
must have violated the constitution through individual actions in order to be held culpable), rev’d on
other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018).
See Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Here, the facts do not show
personal participation by [Norris] in Sonia’s arrest. . . . Norris was busy arresting Brown and
testified that he was not aware Hudson was arresting Sonia.”).
AVERY ET AL., supra note 7, § 4:2.
Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2008).
See, e.g., Webb v. Hiykel, 713 F.2d 405, 407–08 (8th Cir. 1983) (approving a failure to intervene
theory of liability for a supervisory officer who was present when his subordinate beat the plaintiff
and made no attempt to stop the attack).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).
Id.
Id.
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briefed whether supervisory liability can attach under Bivens56 and, moreover,
the government conceded that supervisory liability could attach to the
defendants, were the complaint not, it argued, deficient.57 Nonetheless, the
Court effected a seismic shift in supervisory liability jurisprudence in a single
paragraph:
[R]espondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s
discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the
Constitution. We reject this argument. Respondent’s conception of
“supervisory liability” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that
petitioners may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents. In
a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not answer for the torts
of their servants—the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent
vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding,
is only liable for his or her own misconduct. In the context of determining
whether there is a violation of a clearly established right to overcome
qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose
Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the
same holds true for an official charged with violations arising from his or her
superintendent responsibilities.58

In the weeks after Iqbal was issued, many commentators jumped to the
most extreme interpretation: the Court had rejected supervisory liability
wholesale. Blog posts were published with titles like: “Did the Supreme Court
Wipe Out Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases? It Sure Looks That Way.”59 In
the years since, the academy has coalesced around a handful of more
nuanced interpretations:
1. The narrowest interpretation is that the Court’s discussion of
supervisory liability is dicta.60 The Court ruled against Javaid Iqbal
on separate grounds (that his complaint did not allege a plausible
claim), rendering a separate holding on supervisory liability
unnecessary.61
2. Another similarly narrow interpretation is that any holding on
supervisory liability is limited to the facts of Iqbal.62 Iqbal was brought
against senior officials in the wake of the September 11 terrorist
attacks, and required a showing of discriminatory purpose.63 The
56
57
58
59

60
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62
63

See generally Brief for Respondent Javaid Iqbal, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL
4734962; Brief for the Petitioners, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 4063957.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 56, at 50–52.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP, Did the Supreme Court Wipe Out Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases? It
Sure Looks That Way, WAIT A SECOND! (May 26, 2009, 7:41 AM),
https://secondcircuitcivilrights.blogspot.com/2009/05/did-supreme-court-wipe-outsupervisory.html.
Evans, supra note 12, at 1418.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.
Evans, supra note 12, at 1418.
AVERY ET AL., supra note 7, § 4:4.
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case received substantial public coverage and opinion.64 The facts
framing the case were, in other words, particularly strong, and lent
themselves to a broad ruling. To this interpretation, Iqbal only affects
culpability in the rare case in which the constitutional right at issue
requires a showing of discriminatory purpose.65
3. A third interpretation is that the Court heightened its requirement
that a supervisor be shown to have personal involvement in the
offense.66 Advocates of this approach point to the Court’s
admonishment that, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to
Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.”67
4. Finally, according to the most far-reaching interpretation, the Iqbal
court treated supervisory liability disjunctively, maintaining it under
§ 1983 but rendering it a dead letter under Bivens.68 This
interpretation followed Justice Souter who, in his dissenting opinion,
argued that, “[l]est there be any mistake, in these words the majority
is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating
Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”69 In his view, the majority
created a false dichotomy between “respondeat superior liability . . . or
no supervisory liability at all.”70 This interpretation is consistent with
the Court’s general disfavoring of Bivens actions.
In practice, each of these scholarly interpretations has been over- or
under-inclusive of the circuit courts’ applications. As the Third Circuit
observed, “[m]ost courts have gravitated to the center,” neither interpreting
Iqbal as dicta and maintaining supervisory liability unchanged, nor abolishing
§ 1983 and Bivens supervisory liability entirely.71 Rather, the courts have
tightened the requirements to successfully state a supervisory liability claim,
shortening the permitted attenuation, and raising the bar for culpability.

64

65
66

67
68
69
70
71

See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Court to Hear Challenge From Muslims Held After 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 2008, at A18; Adam Liptak, Justices Hear a Case Weighted by 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008,
at A28; Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Right to Sue Cabinet Officers, SCOTUSBLOG (June 16, 2008,
10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2008/06/court-to-rule-on-right-to-sue-cabinet-officers/.
AVERY ET AL., supra note 7, § 4:4.
See Desiree L. Grace, Comment, Supervisory Liability Post-Iqbal: A “Misnomer” Indeed, 42 SETON HALL
L. REV. 317, 319 (2012) (“Iqbal . . . did not alter the requirement that government officials must be
personally involved; it simply reiterated this requirement by stating that officials are only liable ‘for
their own misconduct.’” (footnote omitted)).
Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
Evans, supra note 12, at 1418–19.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 693 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 318 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes,
135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (per curiam).

Dec. 2018]

SUPERVISORY LIABILITY IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS AFTER IQBAL

647

The Supreme Court has yet to directly revisit Iqbal, but it did discuss
supervisory liability in 2017 in Ziglar v. Abbasi.72 In Abbasi, the Court
considered another matter arising in the wake of the September 11 terrorist
attacks.73 Among other claims, the respondents, six men of Arab or South
Asian descent, brought a Bivens action against three senior officials in the
Department of Justice and two prison wardens, challenging the duration and
conditions of their detention under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.74
The Court held that there existed “special factors counselling hesitation,”75
a prudential limitation that may defeat a Bivens claim.76 Even before Abbasi,
some courts had held that national security concerns were an established,
valid reason for hesitation.77 In Abbasi, the respondents asked for a Bivens
remedy in a national security context against high-level supervisors and
policymakers.78 At the end of the day, however, the Court in Abbasi made
no intimation that Bivens doctrine had changed after Iqbal.79
In the absence of further Supreme Court guidance, some of the most
interesting discussions of supervisory liability jurisprudence have occurred in
the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. Each element of
traditional supervisory liability jurisprudence is discussed below in
descending order of the clarity of Iqbal’s impact. It is important to note that
this subset is not necessarily representative of how things are handled in all
circuits. Some of the most telling signs of Iqbal’s impact (or lack thereof) have
come in the form of consistency and changes to circuit model jury
instructions, and these are noted as they arise.
III. THIRD CIRCUIT ON CULPABILITY
For five years after Iqbal was handed down, the Third Circuit repeatedly
declined to “wade into the muddied waters of post-Iqbal ‘supervisory
liability,’”80 acknowledging only that, if Iqbal did change the circuit’s

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

80

137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017).
Id. at 1851.
Id. at 1853–54.
Id. at 1857–58; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396 (1971).
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857–58; Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 573–74 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the definition of special
factors is limited).
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1852–53.
See id. at 1857 (“The settled law of Bivens in this common and recurrent sphere of law enforcement,
and the undoubted reliance upon it as a fixed principle in the law, are powerful resources to retain
it in that sphere.”).
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Lawal v. McDonald, 546 F. App’x
107, 110 n.5 (3d Cir. 2014) (declining to analyze Iqbal’s effect on supervisory liability); Argueta v.
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d Cir. 2011) (same).
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supervisory liability doctrine, it did so by narrowing its scope.81 In the interim,
the district courts either resolved supervisory liability claims on other grounds82
or applied the Third Circuit’s existing supervisory liability analysis.83 In 2014,
the appeals court explicitly decided to consider Iqbal’s impact in Barkes v. First
Correctional Medical, Inc.84 and, in so doing, exemplified Iqbal’s most significant
and most concrete contribution to supervisory liability doctrine.
In Barkes, the court outlined two general ways in which liability may
attach to a supervisor-defendant: first, deliberately indifferent maintenance
of a policy, practice, or custom that caused a constitutional violation, or
second, if the supervisor “participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights,
directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge
of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.”85 The
“failure to supervise” claim at issue in Barkes fell into the first of those
categories and, as such, was historically governed in the Third Circuit by the
Sample v. Diecks86 subjective deliberate indifference test for Eighth
Amendment supervisory liability claims.87
The Barkes court upheld the Sample test, reasoning that Iqbal now
“expressly tied the level of intent . . . to the underlying constitutional tort.”88
In light of this, the Third Circuit held that, for Eighth Amendment claims,
the level of culpability for supervisory liability must now vary according to
the underlying constitutional tort.89 It would appear, moreover, that it must
vary in lock step; whatever mens rea is required to hold a subordinate liable is
the same as the scienter required to hold her supervisor liable. In the case
before the Barkes court concerning an Eighth Amendment violation,

81

82
83

84
85
86
87
88
89

See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130–31 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Numerous courts,
including this one, have expressed uncertainty as to the viability and scope of supervisory liability
after Iqbal. . . . Because we hold that Santiago’s pleadings fail even under our existing supervisory
liability test, we need not decide whether Iqbal requires us to narrow the scope of that test.”).
See, e.g., Gaymon v. Esposito, No. 11–4170 (JLL), 2012 WL 1068750, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012)
(dismissing the claim because it failed to allege a sufficient factual basis).
See, e.g., Campbell v. Gibb, No. 10–6584 (JBS), 2012 WL 603204, at *10 n.6 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2012)
(“[A]lthough the Third Circuit has acknowledged Iqbal’s potential impact on § 1983 supervisory
liability claims, it has declined to hold that a plaintiff may no longer establish liability under § 1983
based on a supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in a violation.”); Major Tours, Inc. v.
Colorel, 799 F. Supp. 2d 396, 398–99 (D.N.J. 2011) (“[C]laims based on a showing that a supervisor
knew of an acquiesced to the discriminatory conduct of a subordinate are not foreclosed by Iqbal.”).
766 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (per
curiam) (reversing on the basis of qualified immunity).
Id. at 316.
885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989) (focusing on whether an individual “was aware that [an] unreasonable
risk existed” and whether that individual “was indifferent to that risk”).
Barkes, 766 F.3d at 317; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
Barkes, 766 F.3d at 318.
Id. at 320 (“[L]eav[ing] for another day the question whether and under what circumstances a claim
for supervisory liability derived from a violation of a different constitutional provision remains valid.”).
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therefore, the Sample test appropriately required a showing of deliberate
indifference for both subordinate and supervisor.90 Aligning supervisor
scienter and subordinate mens rea is an approach most circuits have taken
following Iqbal.91 The change implied in the Third Circuit’s approach is
summarized in the tables below (focusing on the constitutional rights for
which the Supreme Court has granted remedies under Bivens):
Act
4A
8A
14A

Unreasonable
search and seizure
Cruel and unusual
punishment
Disparate treatment
Act

4A

Unreasonable
search and seizure

8A

Cruel and unusual
punishment

14A

Disparate treatment

90
91

92
93
94
95
96

97
98

Minimum Culpability, Pre-Iqbal
Subordinate
Supervisor
Objective
Varied by circuit,
unreasonableness92
taking into
Subjective deliberate account the
constitutional
indifference94
violation and
Purpose to
theory of liability93
discriminate95
Minimum Culpability, Post-Iqbal
Subordinate
Supervisor
Objective
Subjective
unreasonableness
deliberate
indifference96
Subjective deliberate Subjective
indifference
deliberate
indifference97
Purpose to
Purpose to
discriminate
discriminate98

Id. at 319–20.
See, e.g., OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that “ Iqbal makes
crystal clear that constitutional tort claims against supervisory defendants turn on the requirements
of the particular claim—and, more specifically, on the state of mind required by the particular
claim.”); L.L. Nelson Enters., Inc. v. St. Louis, 673 F.3d 799, 810 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that when
“the alleged constitutional violation requires proof of an impermissible motive, the amended
complaint must allege” that the supervisor also acted with “impermissible purpose”); T.E. v.
Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2010) (requiring proof of discriminatory intent for an Equal
Protection claim against a supervisor).
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1985).
See supra Part I.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
See Dinote v. Danberg, 601 F. App’x 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s pleading to establish a supervisory official’s knowledge and acquiescence to an alleged
Fourth Amendment violation).
Barkes v. First Correctional Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 322–23 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Taylor
v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (per curiam) (reversing on the basis of qualified immunity).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009); accord Wiseman v. Hernandez, No. 08cv1272-
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The Barkes court did caution that applying the same level of culpability to
both subordinate and supervisory liability does not mean “ignoring the
different ways” each can evince the same culpability.99 As an illustration, the
court cites the example Judge Hamilton used in his Vance v. Rumsfeld dissent:
[S]uppose . . . that a local police chief or even the FBI director issued a
policy that authorized the use of deadly force against any fleeing subject.
The policy itself would be unconstitutional under Tennessee v. Garner. The
chief or director who authorized that unconstitutional use of force could
certainly be held personally responsible under section 1983 or Bivens to a
person shot by an officer following the policy.100

The Third Circuit has had several occasions to apply its updated
doctrine, largely in Eighth Amendment contexts. In Wright v. Warden, Forest
SCI, the Third Circuit considered an Eighth Amendment claim in which an
inmate plaintiff alleged hazardous prison conditions after he cut himself on a
door.101 The court required a minimum scienter of deliberate indifference
to hold the supervising safety manager liable, derived from the mens rea
required for the underlying, Eighth Amendment offense.102 In Palakovic v.
Wetzel, a deceased inmate’s family alleged that various prison officials and
prison mental healthcare providers had exhibited deliberate indifference to
the deceased’s mental illness and the conditions that he underwent in prison,
violating his Eighth Amendment rights. 103 Additionally, they alleged that
the defendants failed to adequately train their subordinates.104 The court
required a minimum showing of deliberate indifference, derived from the
mens rea required for the underlying Eighth Amendment offense.105 In
Wharton v. Danberg, the Third Circuit considered Eighth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claims, in which the plaintiffs
alleged that the prison system failed to release prisoners in a timely
manner.106 The court applied Barkes and required a showing of deliberate
indifference to hold the defendant senior prison officers liable under either
claim.107

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

LAB (NLS), 2009 WL 5943242 at n.8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009) (noting that Iqbal did not change
the pleading requirements for disprate impact claims), adopted 2010 WL730716 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1,
2010).
Barkes, 766 F.3d at 320.
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 223 (7th Cir. 2012) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
582 F. App’x 136, 136 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
Id. at 137 n.2.
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 218.
Id. at 225 n.17.
854 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 241–42 n.10.
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The Third Circuit’s discussion in Barkes has yet to materially affect the
circuit’s model jury instructions.108 As noted in the comment following
section 4.6.1 of the Model Civil Jury Instructions, the Committee on Model
Civil Jury Instructions Within the Third Circuit remains confident that
supervisory liability based on a supervisor’s direction survived, but that
claims based on knowledge-and-acquiescence or deliberate indifference may
be “more broadly affected by Iqbal.”109 The Seventh Circuit Committee on
Pattern Civil Jury Instructions similarly has not modified its model jury
instructions in response to Iqbal. 110 That said, its pre-Iqbal instructions were
less susceptible, as they did not specify a particular scienter.111 By contrast,
the Fifth Circuit Committee on Pattern Civil Jury Instructions reevaluated
its model jury instructions in the wake of Iqbal. The circuit’s pre-Iqbal model
jury instructions required that a jury find the supervisor “had a legal duty to
act to prevent the misdeeds of [his subordinate] and [the supervisor]’s failure
to act amounted to gross negligence or deliberate indifference of plaintiff’s
rights.”112 After Iqbal, the Committee changed this to require that a plaintiff
prove the supervisor “[acted/failed to act] with deliberate indifference” and
emphasized that “[d]eliberate indifference requires a showing of more than
negligence or even gross negligence.”113
Aligning the mens rea and supervisory scienter inquiries beyond the Eighth
Amendment may result in an interesting doctrinal issue: its extension to
supervisory liability claims for which the underlying offense’s standard is
objective unreasonableness. Fourth Amendment claims, for example, turn
on an objective unreasonableness standard for which mens rea does not enter
the equation. The circuit courts have been understandably hesitant to
extend the Barkes court’s holding to Fourth Amendment cases, and to
therefore measure supervisory defendants against an objective
108

109

110

111
112
113

Compare MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
§ 4.6.1 (COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2007), with
MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 4.6.1
(COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2017).
MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 4.6.1
(COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2018) (citing
Bayer v. Monroe Cty. Children and Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (questioning
in dictum the sufficiency of evidence showing knowledge and acquiescence)).
Compare FED. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7.23 (COMM. ON PATTERN
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 2017), with FED. CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7.17 (COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 2008).
FED. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7.17 (COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 2008).
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 10.3 (COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS DIST. JUDGES ASS’N FIFTH CIRCUIT 2009).
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 10.4 (COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS DIST. JUDGES ASS’N FIFTH CIRCUIT 2016).
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unreasonableness standard.114 Such an extension could result in supervisory
liability even in instances where one could not say that a supervisor knew of
and acquiesced in, directed, participated in, or adopted or failed to adopt
with deliberate indifference a policy or practice and, by so doing, caused her
subordinate’s unreasonable use of force. Even within the same opinion,
courts have wavered on the issue. In Reedy v. Evanson, for example, the Third
Circuit established that the plaintiff had to show the police supervisor’s
knowledge and acquiescence in his subordinates’ allegedly unreasonable
search and seizure.115 Later in the same paragraph, however, the court
required that the plaintiff show the police supervisor did not merely
acquiesce, but “directed [his subordinate] to take or not to take any
particular action.”116 Chicago-Kent College of Law Professor Sheldon
Nahmod has argued that the Supreme Court “may not have foreseen and
almost certainly did not intend” that its holding would result in the adoption
of a negligence test for supervisors’ liability for their subordinates’ Fourth
Amendment violations, giving pause to the idea that courts will extend the
aligned mens rea and supervisory scienter approach to Fourth Amendment
claims.117
As a policy matter, aligning the mens rea and supervisory scienter analyses
has three major implications. First, aligning the inquiries can be seen as
reducing the costs of litigation and adjudication.118 A plaintiff can allege
multiple constitutional violations under § 1983 and Bivens, and the Supreme
Court has ruled that the trial court may not streamline its analysis by
assigning liability based on the “dominant character” of the most salient
constitutional violation alleged.119 Rather, the courts must separately
analyze each constitutional right—and the relevant mens rea and supervisory
scienter for violating each.120 By aligning the mens rea and supervisory scienter
inquiries, the argument goes, courts must make fewer separate analyses.
However, aligning the analyses can result in incongruous outcomes. The
mens rea required to hold a subordinate liable is a complex inquiry that varies
not only according to the underlying constitutional violation, but also
114

115
116
117
118
119
120

See, e.g., Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386, 401 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the plaintiff parents,
who brought a section1983 action claiming that the Texas Department of Protective Services had
violated their Fourth Amendment rights by removing their children from their home, had to
establish that the supervisor acted with subjective deliberate indifference—not just objective
unreasonableness); Horton v. City of Harrisburg, No. 1:06-CV-2338, 2009 WL 2225386, at *5
(M.D. Pa. July 23, 2009) (requiring a showing of deliberate indifference for supervisory liability to
attach on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim).
Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 231 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id.
Nahmod, supra note 14, at 297.
Evans, supra note 12, at 1409–10.
Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992).
Id.
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according to the circuit, the type of claimant, and the attendant
circumstances.121 Professor Rosalie Levinson has argued that tying
supervisory scienter to this complex set of factors will result in incongruous
results.122 Professor Levinson has argued, therefore, for a uniform scienter
for supervisory liability. A supervisor’s failure to train, supervise, or correct
her subordinate’s wrongdoing amounts to the same supervisory failure, she
argues, regardless of the subordinate’s specific constitutional violation.123
Moreover, in cases in which the underlying violation does not require intent,
a supervisor’s knowledge and acquiescence, or even mere deliberate
indifference, nonetheless “caused” an individual to be subjected to a
deprivation of her constitutional rights, meeting the language of § 1983.124
Additionally, aligning the mens rea and supervisory scienter inquiries
necessarily moves the bar for supervisory liability to attach.125 In the Third
Circuit, it raises the bar for Fourteenth Amendment claims and (potentially)
lowers it for Fourth Amendment claims, thereby reducing or increasing
supervisory liability’s deterrent effect on supervisory actors.
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT ON THE MUNICIPAL LIABILITY PARALLEL
Before Iqbal, supervisory and municipal liability were considered parallel
doctrines. To successfully state a failure to train claim under either one, a
plaintiff had to show the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the
“known or obvious consequences” of her actions (i.e. the infringement of the
rights of the people with whom the subordinate might come into contact).126
Regardless of the underlying claim, the standard for the supervisor or
municipality was deliberate indifference.127 The Supreme Court first
imposed the standard in the municipal liability context in City of Canton v.
Harris.128 Such a strenuous standard was important because a failure to train
is not facially unlawful, making a claim based on a failure to train particularly

121

122

123
124
125
126
127

128

See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854 (1998) (ratcheting up the deliberate
indifference standard that is typically required by due process claims to a “purpose to cause harm”
standard in cases in which there was no time to deliberate).
See generally Rosalie B. Levinson, Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? Establishing Liability for Failure to
Train, Supervise, or Discipline Subordinates in a Post-Iqbal/Connick World, 47 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV.
273 (2012).
Id. at 296.
Id. at 297.
In the Third Circuit, for example, lowering the pre-Iqbal scienter for Eighth Amendment claims
and raising the pre-Iqbal scienter for Fourteenth Amendment claims. See supra Part III.
Bd. of Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 n.8 (1989); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d
443, 452–54 & nn. 7–8 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1455–56
n.10 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court has established this standard).
489 U.S. at 387 n.8.
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tenuous.129 The courts then imported the standard into the supervisory
liability context.130
Now, by suggesting that the standard for supervisory liability is not always
deliberate indifference, that it depends on the underlying claim, Iqbal has
upset the symmetry between supervisory and municipal liability.131 Professor
Nahmod argues that the Iqbal approach is the more convincing one.
“[T]here is no persuasive justification,” he asserts, “for applying the [Iqbal]
approach to all individuals, including supervisors, while at the same time
applying the [universal deliberate indifference] approach to local
governments,” against which failure to train claims are often brought.132 If
this were not muddled enough, some courts have held that failure to train
claims, already tenuous, were a casualty of Iqbal and did not survive in any
form.133 Other courts have held that failure to train claims continue to be
viable.134 The Ninth Circuit, for one, maintains the failure to train theory
as an option in its supervisory liability model jury instructions135 and the
court affirmed the ongoing viability of failure to train claims in Henry A. v.
Willden.136 The judicial winds are likely at Professor Nahmod’s back but,
until this tension is resolved, there will be a dissonance in the traditional
parallel between municipal and supervisory liability.
V. FIRST AND SIXTH CIRCUITS ON CAUSATION
Given that causation is already a “regrettably imprecise concept,” it
should come as little surprise that the courts have struggled to apply Iqbal’s
also-imprecise discussion of supervisory liability to the causation
requirement.137
On the traditional questions of foreseeability and remoteness, the Sixth
Circuit has generally tried to tighten its inquiry, but has yet to emerge with a

129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

137

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).
See Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 452–54 & nn. 7–8 (adopting the deliberate indifference
standard of municipal liability for supervisory liability).
See Nahmod, supra note 14, at 305–08 (explaining that the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue).
Id. at 308 (emphasis omitted).
See, e.g., Newton v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 2d 426, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing
supervisory liability).
See, e.g., Diaz-Bernal v. Myers, 758 F. Supp. 2d 106, 132 (D. Conn. 2010) (discussing supervisory
liability).
MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT § 9.4 (NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. 2017).
678 F.3d 991, 999 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the complaint does not make a specific factual
allegation that the county failed to provide basic training for caseworkers).; see also Reed v.
Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversing dismissal of failure to train claim
since the district court did not provide notice).
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 807 (4th Cir. 1994).
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new test. In Burley v. Gagacki, the Sixth Circuit considered a claim for
supervisory liability under § 1983, in which the plaintiffs alleged that law
enforcement officers subjected them to excessive force, violating their Fourth
Amendment rights.138 In finding against the plaintiffs, the court emphasized
that, “it is a plaintiff’s burden to specifically link the officer’s involvement to
the constitutional infirmity.”139 Considering whether defendants personally
violated the plaintiffs’ rights in a different § 1983 context, the Sixth Circuit
clarified that “the term ‘participated’ should be construed within the context
of tort causation principles.”140 In Peatross v. City of Memphis, the court
considered a Fourth Amendment claim brought by the administrator of an
arrestee’s estate, alleging that the officers’ shooting of the arrestee constituted
an unreasonable seizure. 141 Addressing remoteness, the court noted that,
“Supervisors are often one step or more removed from the actual conduct of
their subordinates; therefore, § 1983 requires more than an attenuated
connection between the injury and the supervisor’s alleged wrongful
conduct.”142 The court went on to essentially merge the causation inquiry
with the personal involvement inquiry, noting that, “We have interpreted
[personal involvement] to mean that ‘at a minimum,’ the plaintiff must
show . . . there is a causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful
conduct and the violation alleged.”143 This merger of the causation and
personal involvement requirements echoes the Second Circuit’s merger of
the culpability and personal involvement requirements.144
On the supervisory liability-specific question of an affirmative link, the
First Circuit has taken a similar approach: tightening its inquiry, but without
an identifiable new test. Shortly after Iqbal was handed down, the court
clarified in Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo that the plaintiff can establish an
affirmative link by showing that the defendant was “a primary violator or
direct participant in the rights-violating incident,” or that “a responsible
official supervises, trains, or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference
toward the possibility that deficient performance of the task eventually may
contribute to a civil rights deprivation.”145 In Morales v. Chadbourne, the First
Circuit applied this updated Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo standard.146 The court

138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

834 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 615 (citing Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring that a plaintiff
show the defendant’s actions sufficiently connect to the alleged violation)).
France v. Lucas, 836 F.3d 612, 625 (6th Cir. 2016).
818 F.3d 233, 237–39 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 241.
Id. at 242 (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)).
See infra Part VI.
590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Camilo-Robles v.
Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999)).
793 F.3d 208, 221 (1st Cir. 2015).
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considered a claim in which the plaintiff, a naturalized United States citizen,
alleged that her twenty-four-hour detention by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers violated her Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights.147 The court found that the plaintiff adequately pleaded
the existence of an affirmative link by demonstrating that the supervisory
ICE officials were “primary violators” of her constitutional rights.148
VI. SECOND CIRCUIT ON PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
Having given rise to Iqbal itself, it should come as little surprise that the
Second Circuit has engaged in some of the most interesting reckoning with
Iqbal’s meaning. Before Iqbal, the Second Circuit recognized five “Colon
factors” through which personal involvement could be established:
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation,
(2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or
appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or
custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the
continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly
negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or
(5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by
failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were
occurring.149

In the wake of Iqbal, the Second Circuit has largely merged its personal
involvement requirement with its scienter requirement—and, like the Third
Circuit, tied supervisory scienter to subordinate mens rea. In Turkmen v. Hasty,
a putative class of men detained in the wake of September 11 terrorist attacks
brought a Bivens claim against various senior officials, alleging inter alia that
their First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been
violated.150 The court enumerated the five ways to show personal
involvement before noting that, “The proper inquiry is not the name we
bestow on a particular theory or standard, but rather whether that
standard—be it deliberate indifference, punitive intent, or discriminatory
intent—reflects the elements of the underlying constitutional tort.”151
In Grullon v. City of New Haven, a pretrial detainee plaintiff brought a § 1983
action against a prison warden, challenging jail conditions.152 The Second
Circuit reasoned that, while Iqbal may have heightened the personal

147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 221–22.
Id.
Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995).
Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
Id. at 250.
720 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2013).
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involvement requirement, the plaintiff did not “adequately plead the
Warden’s personal involvement even under Colon.”153 In Warren v. Pataki, two
convicted sex offenders brought suit against various New York state officials
responsible for a policy designed to screen “sexually violent predators” for
involuntary civil commitment, alleging violations of their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.154 The trial court provided an instruction to
the jury outlining the personal involvement necessary for a § 1983 claim, to
no objection from either party, with language tracking the third Colon factor
for indirect supervisory liability.155 The Second Circuit held on appeal that
the omission of the other four Colon factors did not evince “plain error
affecting substantial rights that go[ ] to the very essence of the case,”
reasoning that there was no evidence in the record that, even if the other four
factors had been included in the jury instructions, the plaintiffs could have
demonstrated any of them.156
CONCLUSION
Standing here today, eight years after Iqbal was handed down, the
promised earthquake seems to have dissipated. Every court to cite Iqbal has
noted its treatment of supervisory liability as vaguely ominous. To a large
extent, though, that is the long and short of it. In a representative approach
shortly after Iqbal was handed down, the Eighth Circuit cautioned that,
The Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in Iqbal may further restrict
the incidents in which the “failure to supervise” will result in liability.
However, we do not address the extent to which Iqbal so limits our
supervisory liability precedent because, even under our prior precedent, [the
defendant] is entitled to qualified immunity.157

Iqbal first percolated into opinions as a kind of exclamation point on the
established rule that neither § 1983 nor Bivens supports vicarious supervisory
liability. Almost every circuit has since made the next clearest doctrinal
change that Iqbal urged: pegging supervisory scienter to subordinate mens rea.
It would make sense to next resolve whether this approach also applies to
supervisory liability for Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure
claims. The interrupted parallel between supervisory and municipal liability
begs to be resolved next. Thereafter, however, the courts run into uncharted
153
154
155

156
157

Id. at 139.
823 F.3d 125, 130–35 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 136–37 (“If a given defendant played a material role, directly or indirectly, in creating or
implementing, even in good faith, the aforementioned aspects of the sexually-violent predator
initiative that were constitutionally defective, and that foreseeably would be applied to someone in
a given plaintiff[’s] position, that would be sufficient to establish that that defendant proximately
caused the violation of that plaintiff[’s] constitutional right to procedural due process.”).
Id. at 138–39.
Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 n.1 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009); Maldonado v. Fortanes, 568 F.3d 263, 274 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009)).
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territory. On questions of causation and personal involvement, the circuits
have yet to find clear tests to further narrow the boundaries of supervisory
liability. For as long as this uncertainty lingers, the poorly-delineated
boundaries around supervisory liability will force officials to be overly
cautious and leave potential plaintiffs unsure of their rights. While it may
have come as a surprise that the Supreme Court tackled supervisory liability
in Iqbal—an opinion ultimately resolved on other grounds—the Court has
created an ambiguity that almost guarantees a return to the subject before
long.

